

Kennedy - Khrushchev TV Exchange

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The proposed TV exchange interview by President Kennedy and Dictator Khrushchev is more a matter of times than of necessity. We do not hesitate to express our doubts as to the usefulness and purpose of such a TV interview exchange out of a conviction that the Soviet side will benefit by it and ours will not.

First of all, the technical facilities in the Soviet Union are far below the technical level of our far-flung TV network. If Mr. Khrushchev appears on our TV, he will reach practically every American from all walks of life. President Kennedy over the Soviet TV system will certainly have a much smaller and, quite possibly, a deliberately limited audience. For a nation noted for its Yankee horsetrading, this proposed exchange is hardly up to par.


What Should Mr. Kennedy Say to the People of the U.S.S.R.?

Assuming that everything will be arranged satisfactorily and even assuming that the Kremlin will abide by the conditions of the agreement, what then will our President say to the people of the Soviet Russian totalitarian empire?

We strongly fear that some of the President's "Soviet advisers" may fail, as they usually do, to display any knowledge of the nature and character of the Soviet empire. Therefore, we should like to make some suggestions which, if followed, would save much embarrassment in the future for all concerned.

THE U.S.S.R.—NOT A NATION, BUT PRISON HOUSE OF NATIONS


One of the first suggestions is that the Soviet Union should not be identified as "Russia" and in addressing the people of the U.S.S.R. they absolutely should not be called "Russians." It has long been a woeful habit on the part of Americans, even non-"experts," to call the U.S.S.R. "Russia" and its inhabitants "Russians." In many Ameri-



John F. Kennedy

can magazines, over the radio and in telecasting this gross distortion of the fact continues to be prevalent, despite numerous protests on the part of Ukrainian Americans and knowledgeable publications and individual citizens. Even Khrushchev himself on his numerous public appearances always speaks of "the peoples of the Soviet Union" (narodny Sovetskoho Soyuza), or the "Soviet peoples" (sovietski narody). He never uses the term, "the Russian people," to designate the population of the Soviet Union, for the simple reason that over half of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. know themselves to be other than Russians.

Therefore, President Kennedy would score a powerful victory from the psychological viewpoint, if he would name and speak to all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.—Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Balts, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Azerbaijanis and Turkistanis. This would endear him to a hundred million people of the Soviet Union who are not or do not intend to be, by any stretch of imagination or historical truth, Russian.



Nikita Khrushchev

Such an approach at long last by a President of the United States would give the captive nations a ray of hope that the greatest bastion of freedom in the world does indeed realize that the non-Russian nations are subjugated, and are not voluntary citizens of the despotic communist empire.

Another suggestion immediately follows. It is that President Kennedy ignore the "experts" and follow up on his awareness of the true structure and character of the Soviet Union. President Kennedy is on record as firmly standing in defense of the captive nations and against Soviet Russian colonialism. In his numerous pronouncements both as a U.S. Senator and the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy was strikingly articulate on the rights of all the captive nations to freedom and national self-determination.

Therefore, he should state unequivocally in his TV interview that the United States will always support the captive nations in their quest of emancipation and freedom.

FDR and FUTURE of EUROPE

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By Forrest Davis

Washington: The apologists for Franklin D. Roosevelt's surrender of Western interest at Teheran and Yalta explain that a voracious Stalin brutally betrayed the wartime President's hopes for a friendly concert of the victorious powers dealing humanely with the conquered.

NEW LIGHT CAST

Roosevelt, in this version of a lost peace, misunderstood Russian semantics and Bolshevik dynamism alike. Roosevelt thus appears as the fateful victim of Stalin's barbarism along with the Balts, the Poles, the East Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians — all of Eastern Europe in truth.

A sharp and persuasive rebuttal to the legend of an innocent Roosevelt is now receiving the careful study of historians and political specialists seeking the origins of the West's current perplexities and dangers in Germany. The new insight occurs in the best-selling "The Cardinal Spellman Story," an illuminating life of the influential New York churchman by the Rev. Robert I. Gannon, S.J.

The relevant revelation of Pres. Roosevelt's attitude toward the postwar role of Stalin's despotism (chapter 13 of the biography, published by Doubleday) is based on a two-page typewritten memorandum of an hour-and-a-half private talk at the White House.

LEARN OF LANDING

Monsignor Spellman, a close wartime associate of the President's and often used by him for discussions with the See of Rome, was an overnight White House guest.

Winston Churchill, also a guest, received the honor of a formal dinner that night.

Word came that Field Marshal Montgomery had landed two divisions from Sicily on the mainland of Italy. The invasion of Europe had begun. Roosevelt, his hopes high, was preoccupied with the kind of world that would emerge from the war. This was early September of 1943. The President and the prime minister had just met at Quebec for the purpose of strengthening the alliance with Stalin.

That the President was aflame at this time with political postwar plans I can testify.

He gave me leave to publish in a national magazine two articles under the title, "Roosevelt's Grand Design," in which he sketched his desires for a postwar coalition of the Big Four—the USSR, the United Kingdom, the Republic of China and the United States—which would divide the earth into spheres of interest and rule the lesser states through a council of the United Nations.

ASSIGNED TO MOSCOW

Mr. Roosevelt, while affirming faith in Stalin's good will, did not disclose to me, as he obviously did to the archbishop of New York, an eagerness to confide Europe's fate to Moscow however irksome it might be to the populations involved.

It is this mood of irresponsible acceptance of Soviet domination reflected in the Spellman memoir which affords new light on the fate of Europe and gives the document its high significance. For, as the prelate dictated his understanding of the conversation at the time, the President not only supposed that postwar Russia would be too powerful for the United States to challenge in Europe but he showed no regret at the thought of folding much of Europe into a Communist imperium.

The Roosevelt revealed in the Spellman paper excluded Churchill from a final disposition of the world because "Churchill is too idealistic, he (Roosevelt) is a realist. So is Stalin." (The Teheran conference, where Roosevelt shouldered the prime minister aside in favor of Stalin, was soon to come.) Quoting from Spellman:

"The wish is, although it seems improbable, to get from Stalin a pledge not to extend Russian territory beyond a certain line. He would certainly receive: Finland, the Baltic states, the eastern half of Poland, Bessarabia. There is no point to oppose these desires of Stalin, because he has the power to get them anyhow. So better give them gracefully."

Further, Mr. Roosevelt's division of spheres having conceded continental Europe to Moscow, there seemed little likelihood that Russian Communism could be expected to halt its expansion westward. France, under the Socialist Leon Blum's popular-front government, might escape. The President, answering a query from his guest, vetoed